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A n explorat ion 
into their nature 
Victor Tokman* 
The essential object of this article is to 
put some order into the discussion of the 
informal sector. Since the ILO adopted 
the new term, there has been a spate of 
somewhat entangled discussion which has 
at least served to reanimate the debate on 
underdevelopment and give a better grasp 
of the relevant problems and solutions. 
The aim here is to study the limited but 
crucial question of the relations main-
tained by the informal sector with the 
rest of the economy. 
The analysis of these relationships is 
very useful as a point of departure, since 
it permits a more orderly marshalling of 
the various theories propounded on the 
informal sector. They can be distin-
guished by the type of links they 
establish between the informal and the 
formal economy. Thus, in the first 
section, the author presents, with their 
different variants, the contrasting ap-
proaches which envisage these relation-
ships as 'benign' or as characterized by 
exploitation, and outlines a view of his 
own, maintaining that they are relation-
ships of 'heterogeneous subordination'. 
In the second section he attempts to 
estimate, for Chile, the 'balance of 
payments' of the informal sector in 
relation to the rest of the economy, on 
the basis of information obtained from 
the national accounts; ending, in the third 
section, by interpreting the data from 
surveys carried out in Santiago on the 
characteristics and performance of infor-
mal commerce. 
* Director, Regional Employment Pro-
gramme for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Programa Regional del Empleo para América 
Latina y el Caribe - PREALC). 
The tehoretical discussion* 
Although somewhat beyond the pro-
posed scope of the present paper, I 
consider it important to describe at the 
outset what is understood by the 
informal sector. No universally-accepted 
definition of it exists, since, as will be 
seen later, the assumptions introduced 
with respect to its operation are diverse. 
There is, however, a measure of consen-
sus to the effect that one general 
characteristic of the activities consti-
tuting the urban informal sector is the 
possibility of obtaining entry to them 
more easily than to those of the formal 
sector, owing both to technological 
factors and to the structure of the 
market. Predominant in the informal 
sector are activities structured on the 
basis of very small production units with 
low levels of technology, implying very 
modest capital requirements, both 
human and physical. The structure of 
employment in these activities is charac-
terized by the identification of the 
enterprise with the individual, and if by 
any chance other labour is brought in, it 
is unpaid family help. In production 
units of this kind there is no marked 
division between the owners of capital 
and of labour such as exists in the formal 
sector, and, therefore, wages are not the 
most usual mode of remuneration, 
despite the fact that production is 
mainly for the market. From the 
foregoing features it can be deduced that 
*This paper was largely written at the Ins-
titute of Development Studies (IDS) of the 
University of Sussex, where the author was a 
Visiting Fellow from October to December 
1976. It is part of a broader programme of 
academic essays on employment which is sup-
ported by the Ford Foundation. The author 
wishes to thank IDS for the intellectual and 
material support received during his stay. 
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informal activities are carried on in 
competitive markets. 
The question posed by Hart (1973), 
who asked whether the reserve army of 
unemployed and underemployed really 
constitutes a passive, exploited majority 
or whether its informal economic activi-
ties possess some autonomous capacity 
for generating growth in the incomes of 
the urban poor is very relevant, since the 
answer to it will shed light on the nature 
of the sector, on anticipated trends and 
on policy requirements. To provide this 
answer an analysis of the accumulation 
process is required, and the discussion of 
that subject approaches it in two 
different ways. 
On the one hand, it is argued that 
informal-sector activities generate a sur-
plus, or can do so, provided that the 
policy environment does not discrimi-
nate against them. On the other, the 
opposite is sustained and it is argued that 
the main characteristic of informal 
activities is their incapacity for accumu-
lation, which, in turn, is determined by 
the process of accumulation outside the 
sector and, in the last analysis, at the 
world level. The first approach assumes 
that the relationships between the 
informal sector and the rest of the 
economy are 'benign', while the latter 
allocates a subordinate or dependent 
character to informal activities. 
Within each of these approaches, 
there is no a'greement as to the degree of 
integration of the informal sector, and 
hence no single interpretation of the 
process exists. The closed or autono-
mous nature of the informal sector or its 
integration will imply different modes of 
insertion and will affect the accumula-
tion process in a different manner.1 
1
 For a survey of the literature on the 
informal sector, see Tokman (1977). 
1. The benign relationship approach 
Those who introduced the discussion of 
the informal sector (Hart, 1970 and 
1973; ILO, 1972), saw in it the potential 
for a more adequate pattern of growth 
with a more equalitarian distribution of 
income. For them, working in the 
informal sector was the way in which 
those who could not obtain a well 
remunerated job managed to produce or 
sell something which generated an 
income. Their ingenuity in making a 
living out of a situation of lack of access 
to resources and to markets and their 
capacity for survival under unfavourable 
conditions were for these authors the 
proof that they have the potentiality for 
developing their activities further. How-
ever, questions such as where this 
potential growth is located, what are the 
expected trends and what are the areas 
to which policies should be directed are 
closely linked to the question of whether 
the informal sector is envisaged as an 
autonomous self-contained segment of 
the economy or as a sector integrated 
with the rest of the economy in a 
complementary and hence benign man-
ner. 
(a) Under conditions of autonomy: 
the duality approach 
The informal sector is seen by several 
authors (the ILO, 1972; Oshima, 1971; 
Sethuraman, 1975) as an autonomous 
segment characterized by providing em-
ployment and goods and services for the 
lower income groups of the urban 
population. As Oshima (1971) clearly 
explains, "proprietors and their family 
help and employees work for each other 
and buy each other's products" (p. 170). 
This, of course, implies that the sector is 
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also characterized by lack of links with 
the rest of the economy. 
The autonomous informal sector is 
economically efficient and has compara-
tive advantages in relation to similar 
activities developed in the formal sector. 
Its main advantage lies in the socially 
justified factor proportions used in the 
process of production, since labour is 
used to the maximum without exerting 
heavy pressures on capital or on foreign 
exchange. The latter is possible because, 
owing to the technology applied, only a 
small amount of capital is required and, 
in addition, second-hand or (judged by 
formal-sector criteria) obsolete machine-
ry is generally used.2 
The efficient use of the factors 
available generates an economic surplus 
which, if properly reinvested, can foster 
further growth. Most of the surplus is 
reinvested within the sector to minimize 
risks, while part of it is channelled 
through an informal financial system, 
usually at high rates of interest, or 
directly invested in relatives' businesses 
(Hart, 1970). Personal savings are indeed 
small3 and are largely devoted to house 
improvements and new constructions. 
This type of investment is not recorded 
in national accounts, but examples such 
as that given by Frankenhoff (1967) of 
2
 This does not imply inefficiency, since it 
is explicitly argued both by Oshima (1970) and, 
especially, by the ILO (1972) that there is a 
wide range of operations in which the mformal 
sector uses less capital per unit of production or 
can be made to do so through upgrading of 
techniques. 
3
 Oshima (1970) explicitly disagress with 
this observation, since he considers that most of 
the persons within the informal sector are 
usually forced to dissave to survive. He further 
maintains that one of the positive effects of a 
policy in favour of the sector will be the 
elimination of dissavings. 
capital formation in housing in 'favela' 
communities of Rio valued at more than 
50 million dollars as of June 1966 give 
the impression that it reaches significant 
values and that the rehabilitation of such 
communities can constitute an economi-
cally more feasible alternative than their 
eradication and subsequent resettlement. 
(b) Under conditions of integration: 
the complementarity approach 
The growth potentiality of the 
autonomous informal sector is rein-
forced when the sector is integrated with 
the rest of the economy, since the 
linkages are assumed to be complementa-
ry. The informal sector is envisaged 
within this analytical context as an 
'exporter' of all types of products, but 
mainly services.4 It plays a crucial role in 
the circulation process by being located 
near to the consumers, by providing 
credit, by selling in as small units as 
required, and by keeping adequate 
stocks (Weeks, 1971; McGee, 1974). As 
McGee (1973) notes, informal traders 
are engaged in the vertical exchange of 
goods, either in selling foodstuffs to the 
urban population in upward vertical 
exchanges or selling urban-produced 
goods in what are often systems of 
downward vertical exchange, as in the 
case of textiles. The informal sector is 
also seen as supplying important services, 
such as transport and communications, 
in countries where those basic services 
are insufficient (Hart, 1970). 
4
 Hart (1973) suggests that illegitimate 
services are the main export of the informal 
sector. The terms importing and exporting are 
used with reference to inter-sectoral rela-
tionships, i.e., to the informal sector's pur-
chases and sales from and to the rest of the 
economy. 
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The informal sector is then highly 
integrated with the rest of the economy, 
'exporting' three-quarters of its produc-
tion and 'importing' a similar proportion 
of its consumption. In addition, such 
integration is benign, since most of the 
exports are service activities —commerce 
and domestic services- which are com-
plementary to formal production and 
are, only gradually affected by technolo-
gical change (Webb 1974). The sector's 
capacity for accumulation is then en-
hanced by its access through these trade 
flows to the expanding markets of the 
rest of the economy. 
(c) Anticipated trends 
Those who visualize the informal 
sector as a source of potential growth, 
whether autonomous or integrated, 
argue that such growth can be evolu-
tionary in the sense that an increasing 
labour force can be incorporated at 
higher average income levels.5 These 
trends cannot be anticipated a priori if 
the sector is autonomous, since although 
it is recognized that a capacity for 
accumulation exists within it, its rate of 
expansion is independent of the growth 
in the formal sector and of the increases 
in the labour supply of the informal 
sector. It is possible to imagine different 
types of situations which could imply, 
under autonomous conditions, either 
involutionary or evolutionary growth. 
Under integration conditions, in 
contrast, it can be anticipated that the 
5
 Weeks (1973) maintains that there is no 
doubt that the informal sector will grow: the 
only question is whether the growth will be 
involutionary or evolutionary. In the first case a 
larger labour force is accommodated at a 
stagnant or declining level of real income, while 
in the second, the absorption is at higher 
income levels. 
size of the informal sector will expand 
pari passu with the size of the formal 
sector, since complementary relation-
ships prevail. This is consistent, however, 
with different patterns of growth within 
each sector, since it is more likely that 
productivity and average income in the 
informal sector will remain constant, 
while employment expands rapidly, where-
as productivity per worker is rising faster 
than employment in the formal sector 
(Webb, 1974). Mazumdar (1976) devel-
ops this approach further and concludes 
that given stable propensities to consume 
informal-sector goods in the informal 
and in the formal sector, both can be 
expected to grow at the same rate. If a 
downward trend is anticipated because 
of the greater integration of the informal 
sector into the rest of the economy and 
the existence of a bias against the 
consumption of informal-sector goods 
within the formal sector, the rate of 
growth of the former will lag behind that 
of the latter. 
The formulation of policies in favour 
of the informal sector is seen in the light 
of this approach not only as feasible, but 
also as highly necessary. As the ILO 
(1972) points out, "although the infor-
mal sector has potential for dynamic, 
evolutionary growth, under the existing 
nexus of restrictions and disincentives, 
the seeds of involutionary growth have 
been sown" (p. 505). Since it is argued 
that the informal sector presents struc-
tural disadvantages6 because it has 
developed not only without the support 
of State policies but even in spite of 
6
 Emmery (1974) uses the term 'inherent 
disadvantage', where it is assumed that the 
informal sector is always less efficient, as 
opposed to 'structural disadvantage', where the 
advantage of the formal sector is a consequence 
of the privileges it enjoys. 
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continuous harassment, an improved poli-
cy environment will shift resources 
towards the informal sector, allowing it 
to absorb the increasing labour force at 
higher levels of productivity (ILO, 1972; 
Weeks, 1973; Sethuraman, 1976). Poli-
cies can then be devised either within a 
framework of autonomy, as for instance, 
for technological improvement in the 
informal sector (Oshima, 1970), or in 
the context of a more integrated sector, 
with a view to strengthening its links 
through subcontracting with the public 
and the formal private sector, to 
increasing the sales of informal products 
(such as tools and equipment) to the 
agricultural sector, and to redistributing 
income in favour of the lower income 
groups (ILO, 1972; Weeks, 1972). 
2. The subordination approach 
The majority of the authors who 
conclude that informal activities are 
subordinated analyse the accumulation 
process at the world level and take the 
existence of the informal sector as the 
national counterpart of the prevailing 
unequal international system. The analy-
sis of such relationships has been based 
on consideration of trade and price 
relationships (Prebisch, 1963; Amin, 
1973), the transfer and incorporation of 
technology (Pinto, 1965; Quijano, 
1974), and the role of transnational 
capital in the process (Arrighi, 1970; 
Sunkel, 1973; Bienefeld, 1975). The 
main thrust of the argument is that the 
process of accumulation in the devel-
oped countries is such that productivity 
gains are retained within the centres, 
while simultaneously, the gains in 
productivity registered on the periphery 
are appropriated through different me-
chanisms. Such mechanisms vary from 
international price determination and 
market controls to institutional arrange-
ments fostered by transnational capital. 
As a result, the accumulation process 
on the periphery is subordinated and 
gives rise to a heterogeneous structure 
because technical progress does not 
penetrate uniformly but concentrates on 
the modern segments of the economy 
without destroying the old techniques, 
thus generating an overlapping process 
rather than one of substitution. The 
capacity for diffusion of such technical 
progress is in turn restricted by the low 
income-elasticity in respect of food 
products characterizing those who bene-
fit from it, and by the bias of such 
technological change against the produc-
tion of capital goods and the use of raw 
materials and in favour of using more 
capital-intensive techniques. The eco-
nomic surplus is concentrated in the 
oligopolistic -mostly fo reign-owned-
firms, whose propensity to invest is 
mainly determined by the availability of 
foreign exchange for profits realization.7 
The outcome of this accumulation 
process is a slow growth of labour 
demand and an upward shift in the 
labour-skill profile required. Both ele-
ments are combined with a rapid 
increase in the urban labour supply, 
creating an informal sector or marginal 
pole. In this sense, the relationships 
between the informal and formal sectors 
should be analysed as a component of a 
7
 Arrighi (1970) estimates that to ensure 
that foreign exchange is available to allow 
foreign corporations to repatriate profits and 
capital, gross foreign investment in tropical 
Africa should grow at an annual rate higher 
than 10-12 per cent. As such rates are unlikely 
according to historical records, it may be 
concluded that a downward accumulation 
process of falling propensity to invest and 
growing shortage of foreign exchange will take 
place. 
104 CEPAL REVIEW / First half of 1978 
subordinated system of interrelation-
ships at the international level, and the 
transfer of the economic surplus gener-
ated within the informal sector to the 
rest of the economy should be viewed as 
an intermediate step in the transfer of 
the surplus from the periphery to the 
centre countries. 
The mechanism of surplus transfer 
from the informal sector will be dif-
ferent, however, depending on whether 
the sector is autonomous or integrated 
into the rest of the economy.' 
(a) Under conditions of autonomy: the 
marginaiity approach 
Several authors who maintain the 
thesis of the subordinated role of the 
informal sector, and especially those 
writing about marginaiity in Latin 
America (Quijano, 1974; Nun, 1969; 
Santos, 1972), implicitly assume that the 
informal sector is autonomous, i.e., 
independent of the rest of the economy. 
The mechanisms by which surplus 
extraction operates and by which the 
capacity for accumulation is thus 
restricted are mainly the effects of the 
existence of surplus labour, both in the 
formal sector and within the informal 
sector, and of the restricted access to 
modern inputs and to product markets. 
The first classical mechanism is the 
depressing effect of the existence of a 
labour surplus on wages outside the 
informal sector. In Marxian terms this 
argument is similar to that of the 
industrial army reserve. Are the people 
employed in the informal sector playing 
the role of an industrial army reserve? 
Quijano (1974), Nun (1969) and 
Villavicencio (1976) deal directly with 
this question, differentiating the infor-
mal and marginal population from the 
industrial army reserve in the sense that 
they are not temporarily but permanent-
ly excluded from that reserve, that they 
are not temporarily but permanently 
excluded from the formal sector, and 
that, owing to the nature of technical 
progress, the labour surplus is not 
needed for capitalist production and 
hence no longer constitutes a condition 
of existence of the system of produc-
tion.8 On the other hand, the empirical 
evidence available suggests that technical 
progress in the formal sector has been 
followed by wage increases rather than 
price reductions. With capital mobility, 
increases in productivity should be 
absorbed by wage increases or price 
reductions: otherwise, the raising of the 
rate of profit will attract capital, in line 
with the known trend towards profit 
rate equalization. Under oligopoly 
conditions, rates of profit can be 
different, but even in this case the data 
show that increases in the productivity 
of the formal sector have been partly 
passed on in the form of higher wages.9 
To explain why this situation prevails 
in contradiction with the existence of a 
labour surplus, several arguments have 
been presented. First, institutional fac-
tors, mainly trade union action but also 
government intervention, determine la-
bour market segmentation in which 
labour mobility is restricted (Harberger, 
1971; Nelson, 1971; Reynolds, 1965; 
8
 Cardoso (1971), discussing Nun's paper, 
does not accept this point and argues that the 
marginal population should be considered as 
part of the industrial army reserve. 
9
 The intensification of unequal exchanges 
between sectors within the developed eco-
nomies with capital mobility gives rise to 
pressures for their elimination which are 
released mainly through inflation or more 
usually through transfers that lead to inter-
nationalization. This argument is clearly dis-
cussed by Bienefeld (1974). 
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Kerr, 1954; Doeninger and Piore, 1971; 
Gordon, 1971;WatchelandBetsey, 1973). 
This argument usually allocates the main 
responsibility for market imperfections 
to labour aristocracy, but obviously it 
overlooks the fact that monopoly power 
exercised by trade unions follows and 
does not precede the present labour mar-
ket situation, or, in other words, is an 
effect of it and not its cause.10 A second 
argument, which is mainly used in 
neoclassical analysis, is that wage 
differentials are due to different skill 
requirements (Becker, 1964 and 1967; 
Mincer, 1970). However, empirical 
analyses show that income differentials 
between the informal and formal sector 
are only partially explained by differ-
ences in human capital, and that for 
equal skills sectoral differentials are 
around 50 per cent (Souza-Tokman, 
1976; Merrick, 1976; Webb, 1974). 
The main causes of such differentials 
are to be found within the formal sector. 
For the firms operating in it, the main 
consideration as regards labour is the 
stability of a large part of their working 
force, for which they are willing to pay 
higher wages. This willingness is com-
bined with their ability to pay, since the 
highly capital-intensive technologies they 
use in their production processes reduce 
the share of labour in total income. 
There are additional secondary reasons 
which influence wage behaviour in the 
formal sector, connected with the fact 
10
 Indeed, as Arrighi (1970) points out, 
although trade unions will play a role of this 
kind in the future, the main cause lies in the 
structure of the labour market rather than in 
institutional factors. Mazumdar (1975) main-
tains the same argument on the basis of his 
study of the Bombay textile industry, where he 
found a segmented labour market well before 
the era of trade unions and government 
intervention. 
that price reductions could lead to 
instability in product markets under 
oligopoly conditions, to the political 
advantage of having good industrial 
relations, and to the upward bias 
introduced by the greater international 
mobility of the hierarchical personnel 
(Arrighi, 1970; Bienefeld, 1974). Al-
though the labour force employed in the 
informal sector does not play a role as an 
industrial reserve army for the formal 
sector, it can still play it within the 
sector by depressing labour incomes 
below the level that would otherwise 
prevail if a labour surplus were 
not present. This argument has been 
developed by Quijano (1974), who sees 
the marginal segment of the population 
playing such a role for the remaining 
segments under competitive capitalism 
and thus depressing wages within the 
sector and creating a surplus which will 
be transferred to the formal sector 
through financial mechanisms.Quijano, 
however, fails to see that demand for the 
informal sector's products is also 
restrained because of market subordina-
tion. 
The second mechanism for subordi-
nation under conditions of autonomy is 
the lack of access to certain inputs and 
to product markets. The impossibility of 
obtaining stable access to basic produc-
tion resources because these are mono-
polized by the formal sector means that 
informal activities can only operate on 
the basis of residual resources and are 
thus excluded from the possibility of 
technological improvement. The oli-
gopolistic organization of product 
markets leaves for informal activities 
only those segments of the economy 
where the conditions of minimum size or 
stability are not attractive for oligopoly 
firms because they do not permit 
economies of scale and do not guarantee 
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adequate capital utilization. The possibi-
lities of expansion of the informal sector 
are thus subordinated to product market 
access which, in turn, is determined by 
the oligopoly firms operating in the 
formal sector. In these conditions, 
growth is limited and can only be of a 
temporary nature, since after a certain 
minimum market size is reached, 
oligopoly firms will take over (Labini, 
1966; Bienefeld, 1975; Souza-Tokman, 
1976). 
To sum up, the subordination of an, 
autonomous informal sector operates 
mainly through the lack of access to 
resources of production and product 
markets. The industrial army reserve 
argument does not appear to hold good 
either intersectorally or within the 
informal sector. The outcome is that 
informal activities do not generate 
surplus and that their expansion does 
not depend on accumulation capacity 
within the sector, but rather on the size 
of the labour surplus which cannot be 
absorbed in the rest of the economy and 
on the market possibilities left by the 
formal sector. In this sense, subordina-
tion operates through lack of access and 
not through economic surplus extrac-
tion. 11 This subordination is reinforced 
through various mechanisms when the 
informal sector is integrated into the rest 
of the economy. 
1
' This conclusion differs from that 
reached by Quijano (1974), who contends that 
the subordination operates through surplus 
extraction. He argues that the marginals 
contribute to the capital accumulation of the 
intermediate level not only as an industrial 
reserve army but also as exploited consumers. If 
capital accumulation at the intermediate level 
were reinvested at that level, it would not 
experience a tendency towards relative dete-
rioration but, on the contrary, would have 
every possibility of developing in the same way 
as in the pre-capitalist period (p. 425). 
(b) Under integrated conditions of inte-
gration: the exploitation approach. 
Market subordination and lack of 
access to basic resources are reinforced 
by several other mechanisms when the 
informal sector is integrated into the rest 
of the economy in such a way that the 
surplus produced, if any, is extracted 
from it. These mechanisms are related to 
the higher prices paid for its purchases 
and the lower prices obtained for its 
output, the difference being reaped by 
the large-scale sector (Bose, 1974; Gerry, 
1974; Bienefeld-Godfrey, 1976). The 
main purchases of an integrated informal 
sector are inputs, capital goods and final 
products for retailing while the output 
sold outside the sector consists of wage 
goods, intermediate products and per-
sonal services. 
Gerry (1974) argues that there is an 
overwhelming degree of dependence 
upon capitalist industry for the provision 
of essential raw materials (both national 
and, mostly, imported). However, his 
data for informal manufacturing activi-
ties in Dakar (Senegal), where a bias in 
favour of closer integration is expected, 
show that the degree of dependence in 
respect of input supply varies with the 
type of product. Around 80 per cent of 
furniture producers, the majority of 
plastic shoemakers and most of the 
vehicle repairmen and metal workers 
using iron or steel depend on the formal 
sector for the supply of their inputs, 
whereas most of the shoe repairers and 
sandal-makers and the majority of those 
working with glass and aluminium obtain 
their supply from the informal sector, 
through the recovery or conversion of 
discarded materials. 
A similar argument of dependence 
has been developed as regards the 
provision of capital goods, the depen-
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dence being direct when new equipment 
is bought or indirect when it is a 
question of second-hand equipment. In 
both cases, it is agreed that the sector is 
dominated by a virtual monopoly of 
supply, repair and maintenance on the 
part of another form of production 
(Gerry, 1974). As in the case of inputs, 
the very scarce data available relate only 
to informal manufacturing activities and 
show that those using machinery and 
equipment are a small part of the total 
(13 per cent of furniture-makers and 31 
per cent of shoemakers) and that the 
proportion of new machinery (generally 
paid for cash down) in relation to 
second-hand machinery varies with the 
type of product, although the former is 
always smaller than the latter, except in 
the case of metal transforming activities 
(Gerry, 1974). In informal commerce, 
the main part of the capital is kept as 
stocks (McGee, 1973), and in this case 
the interrelationships with the rest of the 
economy are to be found in the purchase 
of final goods for retailing. 
Another subordination link through 
purchases from the formal sector is 
found in informal commerce, where it is 
argued that these activities are depend-
ent for their supplies upon the formal 
sector, usually having to pay high prices 
which they cannot transfer to the 
consumer because of market constraints. 
In this sense, they serve as a 
cheap-labour commercial outlet for the 
formal production sector, whose firms 
appropriate the surplus generated at the 
production level (Marulanda, 1976). A 
distinction should be made between the 
types of goods traded, since the degree 
of dependence and the direction of the 
links will vary accordingly. For those 
who trade in raw foodstuffs, the main 
supplier is the agricultural sector, either 
directly through open market operations 
or through wholesalers; while for those 
who trade in textiles and processed 
foods, the links are generally direct with 
the formal producers or with whole-
salers. This pattern can be clearly seen in 
the case of hawkers in Hong Kong, 
where 70 per cent of those trading in 
textiles buy their goods direct from the 
factory or wholesale, as compared to 36 
per cent of those operating in processed 
foods and to 15 per cent of raw-foods-
tuffs traders (McGee, 1973). 
On the output side, the subordina-
tion links can operate through the sale of 
wage goods, through the subcontracting 
system, and through the supply of 
personal services. In the first case, it is 
argued that the sale of low-priced wage 
goods to the workers of the formal 
sector helps to generate a higher degree 
of exploitation in that sector by 
depressing wages (McGee, 1973; Leys, 
1973; Bienefeld-Godfrey, 1976). This 
low price of wage goods is in turn made 
possible by the existence of a labour 
surplus within the sector and of market 
restrictions. 
The previous discussion of the 
validity of the industrial reserve army 
argument is also relevant here, since if 
wages in the formal sector are benefiting 
from the productivity growth in that 
sector, the transfer of surplus will occur 
at least in part within the labour force. 
On the other hand, the fact that a large 
proportion of wage goods are raw 
foodstuffs makes the urban informal 
sector activities an intermediary rather 
than the main source of cheap food. 
A similar argument applies in the 
case of subcontracting, since the sale of 
cheap intermediate products permits the 
formal enterprise to enlarge its profit 
rate by exploiting labour in some parts 
of the production process. Informal 
activities which sell their output to large 
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firms are then subordinated to them for 
prices and quantities and generally 
receive a smaller income than permanent 
workers within the formal sector for 
performing the same function. This type 
of activity is not very important within 
the informal sector, however, and it is 
concentrated in the clothing industry 
(Servicio del Empleo, Mexico-U N D P-
PREALC, 1975; Gerry, 1974). 
Finally, subordination also appears 
in the sale of personal services, where the 
labour surplus, lack of alternative job 
opportunities and low income-elasticity 
combine to determine small and rather 
stagnant returns. 
On the whole, dependency in the 
case of an integrated informal sector 
affects both the sources of supply and 
the markets for the sector's products, as 
well as prices. Prices of purchases are 
generally higher because those in the 
sector can buy only small quantities and 
they do not have access to credit 
facilities, while the prices for their 
products, mostly services, are lower 
because of the market they depend on. 
In both cases prices tend to be fixed and 
markets controlled outside the sector. 
This subordinate relationship is, how-
ever, concentrated on the importing of 
goods for retailing and on the exporting 
of personal services (Frankenhoff, 1967; 
Bienefeld, 1974). 
(c) Anticipated trends 
The mechanisms through which the 
subordination of the informal sector 
operates depend on its degree of 
autonomy, but the outcome is always 
the same. In both situations, the 
prediction is that growth will be 
involutionary, since either the market 
share will decrease or else it cannot 
expand permanently and the pressure of 
an increasing labour supply will force 
average income downwards. This involu-
tion is inevitable, since informal 
activities present inherent disadvantages 
in comparison with formal activities 
(Ouijano, 1974; Bienefeld, 1974; 
Arrighi, 1970). Room for policy 
formulation within this approach is 
indeed very narrow, since the main 
causes of underdevelopment lie not 
within the informal sector, not even 
within the peripheral economies, but in 
the accumulation process of the centre 
countries. 
3. A third approach 
(a) The conceptual framework 
In this section a conceptual framework 
will be proposed which might allow 
adequate discussion of the informal 
sector. This framework is not entirely 
different from the two approaches 
discussed, since it presents common 
features with both of them, but it is 
much closer to the subordination ap-
proach than to the benign relationship 
approach. 
Subordination at the international 
and national levels is a characteristic of 
underdevelopment, and the informal 
sector analysis is only one way to look at 
a much more comprehensive phenome-
non. Internal subordination is expressed 
in lack of access to resources and 
markets, resulting in a limited capacity 
for accumulation and hence for expan-
sion of the sector. The dependence 
nexus found in an integrated informal 
sector generally involves price differen-
tials against the sector, but in the last 
analysis these are merely reflections of 
the said lack of access. The existence of 
subordinate relationships would be ac-
cepted even by those who support the 
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view that benign relationships pre-
dominate. The problem is to determine 
how strong is the subordination and 
whether there is room left for evolu-
tionary growth. The informal sector 
should be seen neither as a completely 
integrated nor as an autonomous sector, 
but rather as one which has significant 
links with the rest of the economy but 
simultaneously presents a considerable 
degree of self-containment. Exports are 
mostly constituted by personal services, 
while the main imports are raw food-
stuffs from the agricultural sector and 
processed foods and inputs from the 
urban formal sector. Subcontracting 
links will not generally be significant and 
will be restricted to clothing. For these 
operations to be important, a more 
integrated industrial structure than that 
which prevails in most of the less 
developed countries would be required. 
The installation of new industries gener-
ally implies the inauguration of national 
production of previously imported prod-
ucts or confrontation with an incipient 
industry which proves unable to survive. 
The possibilities of complementarity or 
survival in a competitive framework are 
higher in those cases where informal 
manufacturing activities are already well 
advanced.12 
It is expected, however, that the 
informal sector will possess some degree 
of autonomy, not only because it 
internally supplies its own demand for 
most of the industrial goods, but mainly 
because of the influence of informal 
commerce activities and the importance 
of second-hand goods. The addition of 
12
 This was seen to be the case when the 
industrial structures of Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela were compared. The degree of 
structural heterogeneity found was inversely 
related to the level of industrialization. See 
Tokman (1975). 
informal commerce mark-ups to practi-
cally all imports from outside the sector 
will accordingly reduce the value trans-
ferred outside the sector, and the 
existence of a widespread second-hand 
market for durable consumer goods and 
machinery will diminish direct depen-
dency while minimizing import expendi-
ture. 
(b) A heterogeneous subordination 
Although a subordinated relationship 
with the rest of the economy prevails for 
the informal sector as a whole, this is the 
result of different processes occurring 
within it. In this sense, it is necessary to 
distinguish those groups of informal 
activities which are currently operating 
under oligopoly conditions from those 
where that is not the case. This 
dividing-line will generally coincide, 
though not always, with the breakdown 
of informal activities by type of product 
(manufacturing goods, personal services 
and services connected with distribution 
and finance) (Souza-Tokman, 1976; 
Bienefeld, 1975; Godfrey-Bienefeld, 
1976; Tokman, 1976). 
Those informal activities already 
operating under oligopoly conditions 
cannot be expected to expand perma-
nently. The evolution of this type of 
market passes through different phases 
where informal activities will expand or 
contract depending on the rate of 
expansion of demand, minimum scale of 
operation for different sizes of establish-
ments, economies of scale, etc. Although 
they may benefit from short-term 
profits, in the long run they will tend 
to lose markets. This is the case for most 
of the informal manufacturing activities. 
The above argument does not neces-
sarily imply that the informal activities 
operating under these conditions will 
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disappear, nor that they will do so in a 
fixed period of time. On the contrary, 
there are several factors which could 
produce a less pronounced trend or even 
an opposite one (Tokman, 1976, Steindl, 
n.d.). These factors are mainly related to 
the constraints on the expansion of the 
oligopolistic firms and to the existence 
of imperfect competition in product and 
especially in factor markets. Clientele 
relations, location, and minimum size of 
sales are among the factors which 
operate within the former, while the 
predominance of family labour makes 
wages more flexible and allows for 
greater social security evasion. 
In addition, there are political 
factors, such as the convenience for the 
large firms of not being presented to the 
government and public as monopolies, 
which lead them to tolerate the exis-
tence of informal activities. Finally, 
those employed in the sector are 
reluctant to leave their present jobs and 
are willing to take high risks at a very 
low level of income, especially when job 
opportunities outside the sector are 
limited.13 These economic causes are 
also associated with structural factors, 
which are specially important in the case 
of low-skill activities such as those of 
hawkers. In these cases, their location 
close to their home and public make 
them reluctant to move, and this in turn 
is linked to age, education and the 
non-existence of employment opportun-
ities (McGee, 1973). 
13
 This reluctance to change activities is 
explained in economic terms. As family labour 
predominates within the sector, workers are 
willing to accept an income reduction rather 
than to reduce employment, since, given the 
lack of job opportunities outside the sector, 
this would imply open unemployment for those 
members of the family leaving the informal 
productive unit. 
Within those informal activities 
which do not currently confront an 
oligopoly market, a distinction must be 
made between those cases where a trend 
in such a direction can be anticipated 
and those where that situation appears 
unlikely. The former possibility seems to 
apply to most of the manufactured 
products which are still entirely supplied 
by the informal sector, as in the case 
with shoe production in many devel-
oping countries. However, such a situa-
tion will prevail only until the size of the 
market justifies the establishment of an 
oligopoly firm, whereupon analysis 
under oligopolistic conditions will be 
applicable. 
There are other informal activities, 
mainly personal services, where a trend 
to oligopolization seems unlikely over 
the medium term. Technological change 
in these activities is more gradual, and 
their subsistence in economies with 
higher income levels gives grounds for 
anticipating their expansion. Given their 
low income-elasticity, however, the ex-
pansion of such activities will not be 
rapid, and this is combined with the fact 
that income improvements based on 
productivity changes are not likely to 
occur. Under these conditions, as 
Bienefeld (1975) notes, if other activities 
do not pass on to prices the benefits of 
productivity gains, a form of 'unequal 
exhange' will then develop against the 
service workers. 
An intermediate case which should 
be discussed further is that of informal 
commerce activities. Technological 
change within these is also gradual and 
oligopoly trends are slower. In addition, 
the factors which determine the survival 
of informal units under oligopoly condi-
tions are very much present in this case. 
Market imperfections (especially demand 
behaviour at low income levels) intro-
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duce a sort of product differentiation 
which ensures the permanence of these 
activities for longer periods than can be 
expected for, say, informal manufac-
turing activities. Location, personal 
owner-customer relationships, credit, 
infinite possibilities of product subdivi-
sion, permanent availability because of 
the inexistence of 'business hours', etc., 
are factors which allow them to maintain 
a share in the overall market. It is true 
that many of these factors are linked to 
insufficient purchasing power, and in the 
long run the introduction of super-
markets will imply much the same 
conditions as in the case of oligopoly 
markets. They are, however, entangled 
with cultural patterns which make 
changes in consumption patterns more 
difficult, as is well illustrated by the 
development of these activities in econo-
mies with higher levels of income. 
(c) Anticipated trends: some tentative 
conclusions. 
In conclusion, it would seem that we 
should expect a declining trend in the 
share of income for the sector as a 
whole, but this does not imply that the 
informal sector will disappear, not only 
because the pattern of development 
followed by the present developed 
countries has shown that informal 
activities subsist at very high income 
levels (Hobsbawn, 1969), but also 
because the resistance factors, together 
with market evolution, will allow their 
survival (Souza-Tokman, 1976; Biene-
feld, 1975;Arrighi, 1970). 
Given the composition of the infor-
mal sector's balance of payments, there 
are also grounds for expecting a 
declining trend in its terms of trade. This 
aspect should, however, be a matter of 
further discussion, since the internation-
al dependence analysis cannot be au-
tomatically transplanted to the internal 
level. Although it is clear that both 
prices and markets are determined 
outside the sector, hence implying a 
dependence relationship, its balance-of-
payments composition is diversified and 
mostly constituted by low income-
elasticity goods. The prices of exports of 
personal services are not expected to 
grow at a rapid rate, but that rate should 
be mainly compared with price changes 
in foodstuffs (both processed and 
unprocessed), which are also character-
ized by their low income-elasticity. 
Weights, elasticities and prices of these 
balance-of-payments components should 
be further subjected to empirical analysis 
before trends can be anticipated. 
The anticipated smaller share in total 
income, together with the expansion of 
the labour supply for the sector, give 
grounds for forecasting that if no 
measures are taken, involutionary 
growth will occur. Informal-sector activi-
ties may display inherent disadvantages, 
if judged by formal-sector criteria, but 
they, in turn, depend on policy deci-
sions, and in this sense the disadvantage 
of the informal sector should be 
considered structural. Evolutionary 
growth should then be feasible, but that 
implies going much further than pro-
viding a 'favourable policy environment' 
to avoid discrimination against the sector 
or supporting informal activities without 
attacking the causes of underdevelop-
ment. Indeed, a substantial change in the 
prevailing international economic order 
is required, but this will not in itself be 
sufficient. Neither should national insti-
tutional changes alone be expected to 
change the observed pattern of growth. 
For such measures to be effective, they 
should be complemented with changes in 
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surplus distribution and allocation and taken not only to favour informal 
with changes in the pattern of growth.14 activities but to affect directly formal-
This means that measures should be sector activities as well. 
B. 
The informal sector's balance of payments 
1. Objective 
In this section an attempt will be made 
to estimate the informal sector's balance 
of payments with the rest of the 
economy. Much of the theoretical 
discussion reviewed above 'assumes' 
different degrees of interrelationships 
between sectors, but very few data are 
supplied to test the alternative hypothe-
ses presented. The quantification of the 
informal sector's balance of payments 
will enable us to analyse the degree of 
openness of the sector, if any, and the 
characteristics of the intersectoral links, 
and it will also provide some basis for 
exploring the behaviour of the terms of 
trade and market possibilities. The 
analysis will refer to the case of Chile. 
2. Sources and methodology 
In order to estimate the informal sector's 
balance of payments, a prerequisite is to 
calculate the complete set of production 
and income accounts of the sector. This 
task, in turn, makes it necessary to work 
with the national accounts of the 
country to avoid inconsistencies. In 
short, a disaggregation of the national 
accounts is needed, and, given the 
information available, such a task is 
14
 This conclusion is also reached by 
Arrighi (1970) for tropical Africa. 
confronted with a number of problems. 
For this reason, the figures presented in 
this section should be considered as 
illustrations of a methodology and the 
conclusions reached should be carefully 
qualified. 
No attempt will be made to describe 
in great detail the methodology and 
sources used. However, it is important to 
mention briefly the principal sources 
which were drawn upon, as well as the 
principal methodological steps followed. 
The national accounts served as the 
point of departure. To disaggregate the 
informal sector from the rest of the 
economy, several sources were used, 
mainly the population census of 1970 
and the manufacturing industry census 
of 1967; the unpublished pre-census of 
manufactures in 1967, which made it 
possible to analyse the industrial estab-
lishments with fewer than five employ-
ees that were not included in the census; 
a national survey of small industrial 
establishments and artisan workshops 
(1967); a Greater Santiago household 
budget survey (1968); a national house-
hold income survey (1969); the periodi-
cal national survey of commercial and 
service activities; an input-output table 
for 1962 disaggregated by 54 sectors and 
its new 1965 version prepared by the 
RAS method; and additional unpubli-
shed information supplied by the Plan-
ning Office for this study. 
The information was worked out at 
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the maximum level of disaggregation 
that the sources allowed. This implied 
working with manufacturing industry at 
three digits, construction, commerce 
divided into wholesale and retail, trans-
portation divided into passenger, goods 
and means of transport, and services 
divided into nine different categories. 
The first step was to estimate 
employment, production and value ad-
ded in the informal sector, by branches. 
For this purpose, employment was 
estimated with the total labour force 
broken down by subsectors and by 
occupational position. In addition, the 
population and industrial censuses were 
also used. Production and value added 
per employed person in each informal 
activity were then estimated on the basis 
of industrial pre-census and census data, 
the national survey of small industrial 
establishments, and the national survey 
of commerce and service activities (see 
table 1). 
The second step was to estimate 
total consumption of the informal 
sector. Savings and direct taxation were 
assumed to be nil, since family savings 
are negative in the case of Chile, 
especially in the lower income brackets, 
and payments of direct taxes are also 
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cAs percentages of total value added in each sector. 
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consumption was equal to net value 
added after deducting indirect taxes. The 
consumption of the informal sector by 
sector of origin was estimated by 
grouping the items which constitute the 
household expenditure of the lowest 
income bracket (those earning less than 
twice the minimum legal wage) into 
those goods and services produced and 
marketed outside the sector (electricity, 
gas, kerosene, etc.), those produced and 
marketed within the sector (bread, 
shoes, clothing, etc.), those produced by 
the rural sector and marketed by the 
informal sector (fruits and vegetables, 
milk, etc.) and those produced by the 
formal sector and marketed by the 
informal sector (processed foodstuffs, 
tobacco, beverages, appliances, etc.). 
The third step was to estimate the 
intermediate production of the informal 
sector by sector of destination. For this 
purpose, the input-output tables of 1962 
and 1967 were used. The fourth step was 
to allocate final demand between con-
sumption and investment uses. Value 
added in informal construction activities 
was considered the only investment 
component, and consumption was esti-
mated as a residual, assuming that no 
exports outside the country were made 
from the sector. As the amount of 
informal sector consumption supplied 
through goods and services generated 
within the sector was known from the 
second step, the remainder constituted 
sales of consumer goods and services to 
the rest of the economy. 
Finally, the inputs of the informal 
sector were estimated by deducting the 
value added from total production. The 
allocation of inputs by sector of origin 
was effected by assuming that intermedi-
ate sales to the informal sector itself 
were known from step three, and by 
allocating the balance between the rural 
and formal sectors on the basis of the 
input-output tables. 
The basic information estimated 
with the methodology outlined above 
made it possible to estimate the balance 
of payments of the informal sector with 
the rest of the economy for 1967. 
Furthermore, intersectoral balances of 
payments between the informal and 
rural sectors and between the informal 
and formal sectors were also constructed 
(see table 2). 
3. Findings 
No attempt will be made to analyse the 
size and characteristics of the informal 
sector, though in fact this can be done 
with the information presented in the 
tables. It is worth noting, however, that 
employment in informal activities repre-
sented around 40 per cent of total urban 
employment and 27 per cent of national 
employment, while in urban production 
the sector's share was 18 per cent and 
in urban value added 15 per cent. The 
data also show that informal-sector 
employment and value added are highly 
concentrated in personal services and 
commerce, which account for 70 per 
cent of employment and 72 per cent of 
value added. Manufacturing accounts for 
23 per cent of employment and 21 per 
cent of value added. 
(a) The balance-of-payments position 
The balance of payments of the 
informal sector with the rest of the 
economy registers a surplus equivalent to 
about 20 per cent of its exports. This 
implies that the sector is contributing 
that amount of resources to the 
expansion of the other sectors. However, 
the situation is not homogeneous, since 
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Table 2 
CHILE: INFORMAL-SECTOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1967 
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Source: For the methodology used, see text. The main sources used were as follows: (i) the informal-sector 
production accounts by sector of origin were calculated on the basis of ODEPLAN (1973, 1965) and 
M.Gómez (1969); (ii) the uses of informal-sector income by sector were allocated by applying 
coefficients calculated on the basis of the DEC household budgets survey (1968-1969); (in) the 
informal-sector production accounts by sector of distribution were calculated by disaggregating the 
input-output tables presented by ODEPLAN (1965) and M. Gómez (1969); (iv) the balance of payments 
was calculated from the three main accounts mentioned above. 
aAs percentages of exports. 
t>As percentages of availably goods and services {production minus exports plus imports). 
the breakdown of intersectoral trade These results suggest that the informal 
flows clearly shows that while the sector is playing an intermediary role in 
informal sector transfers resources to the the transfer of resources between the 
formal sector corresponding to around rural and the formal sector, but they also 
30 per cent of its exports to the sector in show that it is contributing in net terms 
question, it is in turn receiving transfers to the resource availability of the latter 
from the rural sector amounting to 41 (see again table 2). 
per cent of its exports to that sector. Investment, mostly in housing, plus 
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the existence of a positive balance on the 
current account with the rest of the 
economy, indicates that the informal 
sector is generating a surplus of around 
20 per cent of its income. ls This surplus 
coincides with the difference in the level 
of consumption per family between the 
population employed in the informal 
sector and the total urban population 
earning less than twice the nominal 
minimum wage. It seems difficult to 
explain this high propensity to save in a 
situation of underconsumption, but 
several hypotheses can be advanced for 
further research. 
First, the accumulation process in 
the informal sector is greatly biased 
towards housing, both of the low-cost 
type and for the open market. The direct 
link between savings and either direct 
construction or the financial market acts 
as a strong incentive to sacrifice present 
consumption. In this sense, the payment 
of a house mortgage or the deposit made 
in order to be entitled to a subsequent 
loan constitutes a financial investment 
that could be consistent with the surplus 
registered in the balance of payments.16 
The same argument can be applied in the 
case of vehicles, especially taxis, trucks 
and small buses. Secondly, the role of 
the State in this context should be 
15
 Given the difficulties of estimating 
investment in machinery and vehicles, total 
investment of the sector is taken as being equal 
to construction. However, a positive investment 
in vehicles or machinery will only affect the 
share of physical and financial investments, 
since an increase in imports of capital goods 
will reduce the balance-of-payments surplus. 
16
 This seems to be especially true of 
domestic services, which account for half of the 
balance-of-payments surplus. In this case, the 
very partial evidence available suggests that 
most of the savings are channelled through the 
low-cost housing market or through the public 
savings and loan system. 
carefully analysed. The majority of the 
surplus generated by the sector is 
extracted by the State, mainly through 
indirect taxation; but it can also return 
directly tied to investment. Such is the 
case, for instance, with the net subsidy 
component of public housing program-
mes and with the replacement of vehicles 
for public transport. In this respect, 
the State will be directly financing all, 
or at least part, of the physical and finan-
cial investment made by the sector. 
The results also suggest that the 
informal sector is in an intermediate 
position as regards to its degree of 
openness, since, contrary to the assump-
tions of numerous authors, it is neither 
completely self-contained nor closely 
integrated with the rest of the economy. 
The export share of the available goods 
and services within the informal sector 
(informal sector production minus its 
total exports plus its total imports) 
comes to 45 per cent, while the import 
share is around 36 per cent. 
Analysis of the import structure by 
sector of origin and by type of goods 
shows that while the informal sector is 
relatively autonomous on the inputs 
side, supplying around 82 per cent of its 
requirements from within, it registers a 
greater degree of dependency on the 
consumption side. Around 51 per cent 
of total consumption is supplied from 
outside sources, especially the formal 
sector, which satisfies 37 per cent of total 
consumption (processed foodstuffs, ba-
sic services, durable goods, etc.). 
The export structure reflects a mixed 
situation as regards the importance of 
the other sectors' markets as outlets for 
informal-sector production. Around 80 
per cent of the investment made by the 
informal sector, mostly in construction, 
is placed within the sector, while 
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one-third of the informal intermediate 
products sold are exported to the rest 
of the economy, mainly commercial and 
transport services to the rural sector and 
all types of intermediate goods and 
services to the formal sector. The 
importance of markets outside the sector 
is greater in the case of consumer goods 
and services, since more than half of its 
total production of this type is sold to 
the formal sector, and comprises mainly 
commerce and personal services, but also 
a significant amount of informal manu-
factured goods (see table 3). 
Table 3 
INCOME-ELASTICITIES OF INFORMAL-SECTOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
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Sources: Structure of exports and imports from table 2. 
Elasticities from R. Roldan (1974). 
To sum up, the balance-of-payments 
position of the informal sector shows 
that the sector is relatively integrated 
into the rest of the economy and that its 
main links are with the formal sector. 
Such links are mostly concentrated in 
exports of consumer goods and services 
(mainly commerce, personal services and 
some manufactured goods) and in 
imports of goods and services, also for 
consumption purposes (mainly processed 
foodstuffs, durable manufactured goods 
and basic services). On the other hand, it 
also shows that the formal sector 
receives resources from the informal 
sector but that, in part, those resources 
are only channelled through the latter, 
since they originate primarily in the rural 
sector. 
(b) The balance-of-payments outlook 
Given the structure of the intersec-
toral trade flows, some exploration can 
be made of anticipated trends and 
historical price evolution. The first of 
these areas can be approached, very 
roughly, by analysing the income-
elasticities for the different tradeable 
products, while the second can be 
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studied by analysing the changes regis-
tered in the terms of trade. 
The study made by Roldan (1974) 
on consumption functions for Greater 
Santiago gives information on expendi-
ture-elasticities by sector of origin and 
by income level for 1969. He presents 
two sets of elasticities: one for those 
families receiving less than twice the 
minimum wage, and the other for 
families with incomes higher than that 
limit. The first set of data can serve as a 
proxy for expenditure-elasticity of 
the persons employed in the informal sec-
tor and hence can provide an idea of 
changes in demand for imports on the 
part of the informal sector. The second 
set of data can be used to estimate the 
expected behaviour pattern of market 
possibilities for exports from the infor-
mal sector. 
If the elasticities are weighted by the 
share of each type of good or service in 
total exports and imports, it can be seen 
that the average elasticity for exports of 
the informal sector is more than double 
the average elasticity of its imports. This 
is explained by the structure of imports 
and exports, since the former are 
concentrated on foodstuffs (processed 
and unprocessed), which are character-
ized by very tow elasticities, while the 
latter are concentrated on commerce and 
personal services (mostly domestic ser-
vices), which both show high elasticities 
(see table 3).17 This suggests that, if the 
distribution of income does not change 
significantly, one would expect an 
increasing surplus transfer from the 
informal to the formal sector. However, 
the trend followed will largely depend 
on the situation of the personal services 
17
 Even if domestic services are excluded, 
the elasticity of exports is still 36 per cent 
greater than that of imports. 
market, since although the elasticity 
suggests a growing demand for such 
services, the net contribution will de-
pend on the income paid, which, in turn, 
will be closely linked to labour force 
availability. 
Finally, a terms-of-trade index com-
paring the changes in export and import 
prices during the 1960s can be con-
structed in order to analyse whether the 
surplus is being extracted from the 
sector through the same mechanism as is 
observable at the international level 
between peripheral and centre countries. 
For this purpose, different indexes were 
applied for each export and import 
component. On the export side, changes 
in commerce returns were calculated on 
the basis of the changes in retail prices of 
foodstuffs, assuming that margins were 
constant; changes in personal services 
incomes, on the basis of an index of 
domestic servant's wages; changes in 
construction returns, on the basis of an 
index of wages of unskilled contruction 
workers; and changes in manufactured 
goods exports, on the basis of an index 
of prices of shoes and clothing. On the 
import side, the indexes used were: for 
unprocessed foodstuffs, an index of 
prices of ten fruits and vegetables; for 
processed foodstuffs, an index of prices 
of 14 goods; for public services, an index 
of electricity tariffs; and for durable 
goods, an index of electric iron prices 
(see table 4). 
The resulting terms-of-trade index 
shows that the export and import prices 
of the informal sector changed at 
practically the same rate during the 
1960-1970 period. If anything, the data 
suggest that the prices paid by the 
informal sector for its imports grew at a 
slower rate than the prices received for 
its exports, the result being an improve-
ment in the terms of trade of around 12 
T a b l e 4 







































































































































































Sources: Export prices: Commerce and transport and food prices component of cost-of-living index for Greater Santiago, from Banco Central de Chile (several issues); 
personal services, domestic servants' wages from Superintendencia de Seguridad Social (several issues); construction, unskilled construction workers' wages, 
unpublished data from Cámara de la Construcción; manufactured goods, footwear and clothing prices, from INE (several issues). 
Import prices: Rural goods, prices of 10 fruits and vegetables, from INE (several issues); manufactured goods, prices of 14 processed foodstuffs, from INE 
(several issues); basic services, electricity tariffs from INE (severd issues); durable manufactured goods, changes in electric iron prices from INE (several issues). 
Terms of trade: Export price index divided by import price index. 
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per cent in the course of the whole 
decade. The improvement is, however, 
concentrated in domestic services, and if 
these are excluded, the terms of trade 
deteriorate by about 8 per cent. The 
data should not be taken at face value, 
but they do shed some doubt on the 
significance of the deterioration of the 
terms of trade of the informal sector as a 
mechanism of surplus extraction. 
At the beginning of this section, it 
was mentioned that employment and 
output of the informal sector are mainly 
concentrated in personal services and 
commerce. Although, as shown above, 
an expansion in the market for the 
former type of activities is reasonably 
The evolution of the share of the 
informal sector in total income will 
largely depend on the anticipated 
changes in service activities. A large 
proportion of informal-sector employ-
ment is concentrated in 'traditional' 
services, such as those provided by 
domestic servants and street vendors, 
and its inverse relationship with develop-
ment gives grounds for anticipating a 
declining trend in the long run. The 
problem arises, however, in trying to 
forecast the informal sector's share in 
'complementary' services. For these 
activities a high correlation between its 
total output share and growth has been 
found (Katousian, 1970; Sabolo, 1975). 
This question has been analysed for 
Chile by Sansone (1977), who found an 
income-elasticity for commercial activi-
likely if growth and concentration of 
income are combined, the income 
differentials and the semi-feudal working 
relationships prevailing in this market 
(especially in domestic services) will not 
allow such a development to contribute 
to the improvement of incomes of those 
employed in the informal sector. A 
different situation may prevail in the 
case of commercial activities, which 
account for 26 per cent of employment 
in the informal sector and almost half of 
its output. The special characteristics of 
activities of this type and the scant 
empirical knowledge of their operation 
call for a more thorough analysis. This 
will be attempted in the next section. 
ties of around 0.80, and anticipated an 
expansion of commercial output practi-
cally pari passu with that of total 
income. 
The main question, however, is what 
will happen within the sector, since 
competition between different produc-
tion units could lead to a decrease in 
informal commercial activities in spite of 
an increasing market share for the sector 
as a whole. Indeed, this is the conclusion 
reached by Sansone, who anticipates 
a reduction of the present level of 
employment in petty commerce of 
around 33 per cent in the next two 
decades, while the share of modern units 
(supermarkets) in total sales will increase 
from 35 to 82 per cent during the same 
period. His conclusion is mainly based 
on the assumption that demand substitu-
c. 
Competition in retail services: the case of 
Greater Santiago 
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tion within the sector will follow the 
present correlation observed between 
higher income levels and greater prefer-
ence for buying in modern units 
(supermarkets). 
This linear extrapolation of present 
behaviour should be carefully analysed, 
since many factors complicate the 
functioning of this particular market, 
making prognostication a difficult and 
risky task. Although a single rather 
homogeneous market can be distingui-
shed for commercial services, imperfec-
tions in both product and factor markets 
may affect the competitive position of 
the different units, the result being that 
the declining trend of informal-sector 
commercial activities does not occur at 
the anticipated rate or may even not 
occur at all in the medium term. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will 
deal only with established commerce, 
since street vendors can be included 
within the 'traditional' services group. 
Furthermore, the analysis will be mainly 
restricted to the established commerce 
of processed and unprocessed food-
stuffs. i8 On the other hand, the informa-
tion available will further bias the 
analysis towards the Greater Santiago 
area, on which the few studies already 
undertaken shed most light (Collins-
Garrod, 1971; Sansone, 1977;PREALC-
SENDE, 1976). 
1. Competition in the foodstuffs trade 
The first factual question which should 
be answered in order to evaluate the 
degree of competition in this particular 
market is whether there is a single set of 
18
 Unfortunately, the information availa-
ble did not allow us to analyse informal 
commercial activities in markets, especially in 
those dealing with fresh fruit and vegetables. 
prices for similar products sold by 
informal units (small shops) and modern 
units (supermarkets). The data available 
(see table 5) show that the same 
products, when bought in informal units, 
cost on average around ten per cent 
more than if bought in supermarkets. 
The price differentials are not homoge-
neous but vary with the type of 
products, being practically nil in the 
cases of sugar, detergent, tea and soap, 
while they are concentrated in rice, oil, 
beans and eggs. Some products, such as 
flour and spaghetti, are found at lower 
prices in small stores (see table 6). 
Three factors should be considered 
when analysing price differentials. The 
first is that part of the differentials are 
normal deviations in commercial activi-
ties. This can be clearly shown by 
Table 5 
PRICE DIFFERENTIALS IN THE FOOD 
TRADE 
(Percentages) 







Notes and sources: 1966, P. Baraliona: this study 
refers to a large low-income sector of Santiago 
(Manuel Rodriguez); the 11-per cent differential 
does not include quality differences while the 
20-per cent figure does. 
1969 and 1970, Collins and Ciarrod: this refers to 
a sample survey of Greater Santiago. 1975: case 
studies made by UNICOOP in several medium-and 
low-income sectors of Santiago. ¡976:a joint 
PREALC-SENDE survey of small commercial 
establishments in Ñuñoa, a middle-and low-inco-
me district of Santiago, Meat products are not 
included. ¡976: b estimates made on the basis of 8 
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of small shops, 
1976, and prices collected directly on the 
same date at UNICOOP and ALMAC 
supermarkets. B: Case studies of small shops. 
comparing the prices for the same 
products in the two largest supermarket 
chains of Santiago (UNICOOP and 
ALMAC), where the price differential 
found is around 3 per cent. In this case, 
however, the largest price differentials 
are concentrated in vegetables and beans 
and lentils, and are partly offset by small 
differences from 1 to 5 per cent between 
different brands in most of the other 
products; whereas in the case of small 
stores the majority of the prices were at 
least equal to those registered by the 
supermarket. The second factor which 
makes price comparisons difficult con-
sists in quality differentials. The study 
undertaken by Barahona (1966) shows 
that if quality differentials are taken into 
account, price differentials practically 
double, while Collins and Garrod (1971) 
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show that the products considered, 
although apparently homogeneous, are 
not found in both types of establish-
ment. If the product bought in the small 
stores is replaced by the nearest 
substitute, the price differential changes 
from 24 to minus 17 per cent in 1969 
and from 30 to minus 8 per cent in 
1970. Finally, the question of location 
and vicinity of competing units becomes 
important for evaluating price differen-
tials. In the study made by UNICOOP 
(1975) it is shown that price differentials 
increase with the distance between the 
small shop and the supermarket, 
reaching their maximum at three or four 
blocks from the supermarket. The data 
also show that even the small shops 
located in the same block as the 
supermarket charge between 8 and 10 
per cent more than the supermarket for 
the same products. 
Considering all the factors men-
tioned above, it can be safely concluded 
that the small stores sell their products 
at least at the same price as the 
competitive unit and that, most likely, 
price differentials are around 7 to 10 per 
cent.19 With these price differentials one 
would expect that demand for food-
stuffs would shift from small shops to 
supermarkets. This, however, has not 
happened in the case of Chile, where, on 
the contrary, UNICOOP has recently 
(March 1977) closed all its branches in 
low-income sectors of Santiago after 
more than ten years of unsuccessfully 
trying to break the competition of the 
small shops.20 The survival of small 
19
 This gives little support to the argument 
that the surplus of the informal sector is 
transferred through lower prices to other 
sectors. 
2 0
 In a recent public announcement 
(March 1977) UNICOOP notified the closure of 
five supermarkets operating in San Joaquin, La 
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shops in the face of competition and 
their capacity to retain demand even at 
higher prices than are charged by their 
competitors can be explained by the 
existence of imperfections in both the 
product and the factor markets. 
2. Imperfections in the product market 
Imperfections in the product market are 
the consequence of demand segmenta-
tion caused by different factors which 
sometimes require certain characteristics 
in the production unit that are more 
easily found in small shops than in 
supermarkets. The small purchasing 
power of the majority of consumers, 
combined with their income instability 
and the need to consume a fairly 
diversified basket of goods, results in a 
pattern of demand characterized by 
daily purchases of small quantities of 
different products. 
This hypothesis can be confirmed 
from the data available, since a high 
correlation is found between low income 
levels and greater preference for buying 
in small shops (see table 7). Between 72 
and 81 per cent of total expenditure on 
foodstuffs of the lower income levels is 
effected in small shops, whereas the 
proportion decreases to 16-21 per cent 
in the higher income strata. Further-
more, the persons with lower income 
levels show greater income instability 
and shorter periods between paydays, in 
the Las Condes district 51 per cent of 
the lower income groups received un-
stable incomes, while at the higher 
income levels the proportion dropped to 
26 per cent (Sansone, 1977). In 
addition, a third of the persons in the 
Table 7 
PREFERENCE FOR BUYING FOODSTUFFS IN 
SMALL SHOPS, BY INCOME LEVELS 
Income 
levels 
Small shops' sales as percentages 











Pincoya, Peñalolén, Pudahuel and Villa 
O'Higgins: all sectors where the lowest-income 
population of Santiago is concentrated. 
Sources: A: Collins and Garrod (1971: 
B: Instituto de Administración, Universidad 
Católica (1974), cited by Sansone (1977). 
lower income strata received their 
income fortnightly or weekly, while all 
the persons in the higher income levels 
were paid monthly (see table 8). These 
income characteristics21 result in a high 
prevalence of daily purchases in the lower 
income groups, where around 50 per 
cent of the people go to the market daily 
and 37 per cent go weekly; at the higher 
income levels nobody goes to the market 
daily, while half of the persons con-
cerned make their purchases monthly 
(see table 8). 
Consumption diversification, due not 
only to habit but also to nutritional and 
stand ard-of-living requirements, leads to 
the limited daily average purchase being 
spread over some 18 uses, thus resulting 
in a demand for very small units of each 
product. According to several studies 
made by Aldunate (1974, 1975) a daily 
2
' In addition, and also as a consequence 
of their low income level, they have limited 
storage capacity. For instance, only 2 per cent 
of the families with lower incomes have 
refrigerators, while in the 20 per cent of 
families located in the top income bracket the 
corresponding proportion rises to 87 per cent 
(Sansone, 1977). 
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Table 8 






















Source: Instituto de Administración, Universidad Católica (1974), cited by Sansone (1977). 
basket for five persons purchased by the 
lowest income groups is composed of 
five non-foodstuff products and 13 
foodstuffs, most of them bought by the 
quarter-kilogramme (tea, rice, beans, 
spaghetti, onions), by one unit (eggs), or 
by one-sixteenth of a litre (cooking-oil). 
This pattern of demand imposes 
special characteristics on the production 
unit, namely, capacity to sell in small 
amounts, little product-mix diversifica-
tion and accessibility in terms both of lo-
cation and of business hours. All these, 
factors reduce the return of modern 
units (supermarkets), since technological 
change in commercial activities is closely 
linked to scale and product diversifica-
tion, and in order to ensure the former 
-especially in markets characterized by 
a low per capita income level— the 
distance between establishments should 
be maximized. 
Small shops, however, are able to fill 
the requirements imposed by the con-
sumer. As may be seen in table 9, they 
usually sell in whatever small quantities 
are required. About 80 per cent of the 
establishments sell sugar, rice, spaghetti 
and tea by 1/8 or 1/4 of a kilogramme, 
60 per cent sell beans and lentils by 1/4 
of a kilogramme, 82 per cent sell oil by 
1/8 of a litre, 88 per cent sell potatoes 
by the half-kilogramme, and almost all 
of them sell onions, eggs, detergent 
(1/4-kilogramme package), soap, chicken 
and bread by one unit.22 The opposite 
occurs in supermarkets, where the 
minimum sale quantities are two kilo-
grammes for sugar, one kilogramme for 
rice, spaghetti, beans and lentils, three 
kilogrammes for potatoes, five units for 
onions and one dozen for eggs. 
The question immediately arises of 
why the supermarkets cannot reduce 
their minimum sales units to attract 
customers. The answer is related to 
technological constraints, since a large 
part of the supermarket profit is made 
by buying in bulk and packing mechani-
cally in standard units. In addition, this 
method makes it possible to minimize 
labour use in the sales stage. A clear 
example of this constraint is given by 
22
 Product divisibility sometimes reached 
such lengths as in the cases of sugar and 
spaghetti, which were sold by 100 grammes, 
and oil, sold by 1/10 of a litre. 
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Table 9 





































































































Detergents (unit 1/4 kg) 
Soap 
Chicken (unit) a 
Bread (unit of 100 
grammes)'5 80 1/2 kg' 
Sources: Small shops: PREALC-SENDE (1976). Supermarkets: direct observation. 
a10 per cent of the establishments sell chicken by the 1/4 kg and 20 per cent by the 1/2 kg. 
t>3 per cent of the establishments sell bread by 1/10 of a kg, 2 per cent by the 1/4 kg, 9 per cent by the 
1/2 kg and 6 per cent by the kilogramme. 
cUntil very recently only wrapped bread of different quality and higher price was sold at supermarkets. 
Sansone (1977) in the case of sugar, 
where the supermarket (UNICOOP) 
minimum sale quantity used to be five 
kilogrammes. To reduce the minimum 
sale quantity to two kilogrammes, the 
supermarket had to close its packing 
plant and buy sugar already packed from 
a larger plant which operated at lower 
average costs. The two-kilogramme 
package constituted the minimum limit 
in view of the technology available and 
the price of paper and other inputs. 
The second factor is the limited 
product-mix diversification required, in 
terms of number of products, brands and 
qualities. Most small shops operate on 
the basis of 15 main products of a single 
quality, while product differentiation 
constitutes an important way for super-
markets to compensate for those prod-
ucts where profit margins are small. All 
the small shops interviewed in Ñufioa 
(PREALC-SENDE, 1976) sell processed 
foodstuffs (grains, oil, eggs, etc.), 16 per 
cent also sell non-alcoholic beverages, 61 
per cent sell bread and 63 per cent fruit 
and vegetables. According to the cases 
studied, half of their sales are concen-
trated in three products: bread, sugar 
and oil. 
Finally, the short purchasing fre-
quency requires that shops be accessible, 
since time and transport costs influence 
consumer decisions. The majority of 
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supermarkets tend to be concentrated in 
higher-income sectors, while the op-
posite occurs with small shops, which are 
largely located in lower-income sectors. 
Eighty per cent of the supermarkets of 
Santiago in 1975 were located in the 
high-income districts, while 60 per cent 
of the small shops were concentrated in 
the lowest-income districts. Moreover, all 
supermarkets are located on main street 
or in shopping centres, while, for 
instance, the survey of Ñuñoa shows that 
56 per cent of the small shops 
interviewed were located in secondary 
streets or dead-ends without public 
transport and 65 per cent of them were 
isolated from other shops. The require-
ment of accessibility also imposes long 
and flexible business hours. Because of 
labour costs and regulations, super-
markets work 70 hours per week, while 
small shops open every day, including 
Sundays, totalling in the lower-income 
sectors about 80 hours per week.23 
Finally, there is an additional factor 
which also introduces imperfections in 
the product market: i.e., that linked to 
the special relation which is, developed 
between customer and owner of the 
small shop. This relationship affects the 
functioning of the market in different 
ways, which range from helping the 
consumer to buy the right products to 
offering the possibility of sending 
children to shops, meeting the neigh-
bours and reading the newspapers there. 
The most important consequence of this 
relationship, however, is that it provides 
the owner of the small shop with a 
mechanism for evaluating the creditwor-
thiness of his customers, so that he is in 
23
 A recent change in regulations and the 
demand recession affecting this particular chain 
of markets has led UNICOOP to open on 
Sundays and to lengthen business hours. 
a position to give credit on a personal 
basis and thus bolster up the low 
purchasing capacity of his clientele. 
More than 41 per cent of the small shops 
of Ñuñoa gave credit to their customers 
in 1976, and the proportion rises to 50 
per cent if the shops serving the 
lower-income districts are considered.24 
3. Imperfections in the factor market 
The higher prices charged by the small 
shops should ensure a larger gross 
margin, provided that they pay much the 
same prices as the supermarkets for their 
purchases. The evidence available sug-
gests, however, that the extra amount 
paid by the small shops on then-
purchases exceeds the price differential 
they are able to pass on to the consumer. 
The Ñuñoa survey reveals that direct 
purchases from producers account for 
only 13-19 per cent of the small shops' 
total purchases and are predominantly of 
bread and chicken (see table 10). The 
main source of supply for the small 
shops is located in La Vega (the largest 
wholesale market of Santiago)25 where 
they make about half of their purchases. 
In some cases (around 10 per cent) they 
even buy from supermarkets or other 
retailers, the gross margin in these cases 
being limited to the price differentials. 
In addition, the majority of the small 
shops (69 per cent of them) have to pay 
delivery charges, since they do not own 
24
 It must be noted that at the time of the 
survey, Santiago was registering a 10-per-cent 
monthly rate of inflation coupled with demand 
contraction. Hence, in normal times a much 
larger coefficient should be expected. 
La Vega constitutes the main entry to 
the Santiago market for fruit and vegetables, 
and it also concentrates a large number of 
wholesalers of all kinds of foodstuffs who sell 
in large and small quantities. 
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Table 10 
SOURCES OF SUPPLY, BY PRODUCTS 
Informal establish merits^ Supermarke ts b 
Super-
La Whole- p , market Pro- Whole-






















































































Sources: SENDE-PREALC Survey, 1976, and information given by UNICOOP for 1976-1977. 
aAs percentages of establishments. The figures include double counting in those cases where an 
establishment stated that it buys the same product from more than one supplier. 
^As percentages of total purchases of each product 
means of transport; 55 per cent pay cash 
for their purchases, while those who buy 
on credit are charged 7 per cent per 
month for an average credit of 19 days. 
In sum, these data clearly suggest that 
the small shop has to pass through a 
chain of middlemen in the marketing, 
transport and financial circuits. 
The opposite occurs with the super-
markets, which possess enough bar-
gaining power to obtain discounts for 
large quantities and credit facilities on 
better terms. In addition, they own their 
means of transport, thus reducing ex-
penses under this head. The data avail-
able on the sources of supply of 
UNICOOP clearly show that approxima-
tely 86 per cent of the purchases are 
made directly from producers, while the 
remainder are made from large whole-
salers. In the former case, the savings 
made through bypassing some of the 
middlemen are added to the discounts 
obtained for buying in large quantities 
(see table 10). 
It is difficult to estimate the differ-
entials in the prices paid, because data 
on the supermarkets' real cost are not 
available. Studies made on the marketing 
process of rice, potatoes and tomatoes 
(Fletschner, 1971) and on fruit and 
vegetables (Programa Chile-California, 
1965; ECA, 1966, 1968) illustrate the 
order of magnitudes involved in the 
different stages. In the case of rice, a 
product subject to price control, the 
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distributor margin found was between 
6.5 and 13 per cent; while the wholesale 
and auction expenditure margins on 
potatoes and tomatoes were 31 and 32 
per cent, respectively. For the ten main 
vegetables consumed in Santiago, the 
average wholesale margin was 21 per 
cent if no allowance is made for dam-
aged goods,26 while for the 12 staple 
fruits, the wholesale margin was 16 per 
cent, and that charged by the middleman 
between the wholesaler and the retailer 
amounted to 5.5 per cent.27 This evi-
dence suggests that through savings on 
their purchases supermarkets are able at 
least to absorb the lower final price 
received. This, in turn, would imply that 
gross margins are larger for the super-
markets. How, then, can the small shops 
survive with a lower rate of return? 
Apart from the imperfections al-
ready mentioned in the product market, 
there are also imperfections in the factor 
market which are mainly related to the 
type of organization and mode of pro-
duction of the small shops. Thus, the 
most common form of organization of 
production for the latter is on a family 
basis. Those operating such shops are 
generally self-employed and the shop 
constitutes a unit where the productive 
function is very loosely linked with the 
consumption function. In this sort of 
unit, implicit factor prices are deter-
mined in a different manner from those 
prevailing for the production factors 
used in the rest of the economy. It can 
be postulated that the implicit price for 
labour is lower than the price the 
2 6
 The vegetables included were: lettuces, 
potatoes, tomatoes, carrots, onions, squash, 
spinach, celery, beet, cauliflowers. 
2 7
 The fruits included were: apples, pears, 
lemons, oranges, avocados, bananas, peaches, 
apricots, grapes, watermelons, melons, plums. 
supermarkets have to pay because of the 
existence of family labour and the 
restricted opportunities for outside em-
ployment. Moreover, although the im-
plicit price of capital relative to the price 
of labour may be larger because of 
capital scarcity, the low capital require-
ments of this activity, together with the 
dual use of capital for both production 
and consumption, could result in a lower 
implicit price for this factor too. 
(a) Imperfections in the labour market 
The information available for 1969 
(Collins-Garrod, 1971) and 1976 (PREALC: 
SENDE, 1976) shows that the average 
income received by the owner of an 
informal-commerce unit was 2.12 and 
2.33 times the minimum legal wage paid 
in each year. Total income received by 
the owner was equivalent to 2.6 and 3.2 
times the minimum wage in each year, 
but allowances have to be made for 
unpaid family members working in the 
shop. If the 25 per cent constituted by 
the largest shops were excluded from the 
1969 sample, owner income would 
decrease to 1.02 times the minimum 
wage and if family members incomes 
were imputed the owner's net income 
would fall below that minimum. The 
1976 survey also shows an income 
decrease when the largest units are 
excluded, but its magnitude is smaller. In 
this case, the owner's income after 
deducting incomes imputed to family 
members is 1.9 times the minimum 
wage.28 
The income received by paid workers 
and that imputed to unpaid family 
2 8
 This suggests that the 1976 survey is 
biased towards average-sized establishments, a 
slant which, in turn, is the result of the district 
chosen for the sample (Ñuñoa). 
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members is similar to what they could 
obtain as unskilled workers in modern 
commercial establishments. The alterna-
tive income for the owner is larger, since 
white-collar employees in supermarkets 
earned on average around 3.2 times the 
minimum wage and the self-employed in 
other commercial activities received 2.52 
minimum wages in 1969 as compared to 
2.12 received by the owners of informal 
units.29 Part of the differentials could 
be attributed to differences in human 
capital, since the owners are older 
people, less educated and whith less than 
average previous experience. Collins and 
Garrod (1971), who analysed the influ-
ence of personal characteristics on 
income differentials, found that even 
when sex, age, education and hours 
worked are identical, the difference 
between the income received by infor-
mal-unit owners and that obtained by 
the self-employed in the rest of the 
economy is still 19 per cent, or 7 per 
cent if compared to the incomes of the 
self-employed in services.30 
The question which immediately 
arises is why the informal shop owners 
continue their operations when they 
could obtain a larger income by working 
as employees in modern establishments. 
Apart from the limited occupational 
opportunities available and the unfavour-
2 9
 Confirmation of these data is found not 
only in the sample analysed by Collins and 
Garrod, 1971, but also in the periodic survey 
on commercial activities published by the 
Instituto de Estadística. Both samples refer to 
Greater Santiago. 
30
 Differences are also found between 
incomes of white- and blue-collar workers when 
personal characteristics are identical. In these 
cases the differentials are 12 and 31 per cent, 
respectively, in relation to the same occu-
pational position in the rest of the economy, 
and 7 and 16 per cent, respectively, in 
comparison with services. 
able personal characteristics which re-
strict mobility, the organization of 
production on a family basis also helps 
to keep them in their present position, 
generating a sort of labour market 
segmentation. We have shown that the 
income received by the owner is lower 
than the alternative income if allowances 
are made for unpaid family members. If 
such deductions are not made, their 
income is similar to the alternative 
income. To move out of their present 
activity would imply closing job oppor-
tunities to the other members of the 
family, who would have difficulty in 
finding new jobs and who are frequently 
not available for full-time jobs, as is 
usually the case with housewives and 
school-age children, who share their time 
between the shop, the housework and 
the educational system. 
This organization of production can 
be clearly seen by analysing the employ-
ment structure. Forty per cent of the 
self-employed of Greater Santiago were 
engaged in commercial activities in 1969, 
and three-quarters of those employed in 
the food trade were family members. 
Furthermore, the proportion of family 
members increases as the size of the 
establishment decreases, reaching 97 per 
cent in the smallest shops. It may be 
noted that while the informal shop-
owner works more intensively than the 
supermarkets both in terms of hours 
worked and days open, unpaid family 
members work only about 56 per cent of 
the hours worked weekly by the owner 
and 84 per cent of the hours worked at 
supermarkets. 
(b) Imperfections in the capital market 
The organization of the establish-
ment on a family basis is also reflected in 
the capital market, and this in turn 
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restricts capital mobility. Around 70 per 
cent of the total capital in informal-
commerce units is constituted by buil-
dings, vehicles and machinery.31 
Eighty-two per cent of the owners live in 
the same building in which the shop 
operates, and 85 per cent of them own 
their house. Only 12 per cent possess a 
vehicle, and in all these cases the vehicle 
is a car or station-wagon. Hence, both 
capital components serve also a dual 
purpose by filling welfare needs (housing 
and transport) and simultaneously play-
ing a productive role. Returns on capital 
obtained from operating the shop are 
thus only a part of the total implicit 
return: in other words, the actual 
business capital is smaller than it 
nominally appears. 
Assuming that the total income of 
the owner of an informal commercial 
establishment in Ñufíoa was 2,094 
Chilean pesos in September 1976, and 
deducting the wages imputed both to 
unpaid family members (equivalent to 
the minimum wage) and to his entrepre-
neurial function (equivalent to 1.25 
times the minimum wage),32 a net 
return on capital of 770 Chilean pesos 
can be estimated. Since according to 
Sansone (1977) the capital of small 
shops amounted on the average to 
30,627 Chilean pesos at the same date, a 
capital return of 2.3 per cent monthly is 
obtained by the owner. 
If this rate of return is compared 
with the 1,9 per cent estimated for 
UNICOOP, it can be seen that capital is 
used efficiently in the informal sector. 
3 1
 The equipment usually found in small 
shops is limited to one manual pump for the 
sale of oil, one scale and {not always) one 
refrigerator. 
32
 This is equal to the minimum wage 
legally fixed for white-collar employees. 
On the other hand, if the owner decided 
to close his shop he could invest his 
capital either in the financial market (at 
2 per cent monthly in real terms)33 or in 
other modern commercial ventures (at 
about the same rate). This investment 
would give him a monthly income of 
612 Chilean pesos, and he would have to 
obtain a job paying the equivalent of 2.5 
times the minimum wage to reach the 
same income that he is earning by 
operating his own establishment. 
However, as noted above, not all his 
capital can be transferred, since its dual 
purpose (welfare and production) im-
plies that he cannot sell his house unless 
he can find alternative accommodation 
and he cannot sell his car unless he is 
prepared to sacrifice comfort and defray 
additional expenses for transport. If 
these two factors imply that the capital 
available for outside investment is 
restricted to, say, 50 per cent of the 
total, he would have to obtain a job for 
himself at 2.9 times the minimum wage 
in order to supplement his capital 
returns and reach the same income level 
that he is attaining at present. This, in 
turn, would confront him with the 
difficulties of finding a suitable job at 
that level of income and simultaneously 
it would restrict job opportunities for 
the rest of the family. In short, the 
labour market problems already analysed 
would make themselves felt. 
4. Summary 
To sum up, the evidence analysed in this 
section suggests that the informal-sector 
food shops are able to compete with the 
3 3
 It should be noted that this real rate of 
interest is exceptionally high, owing to the 
special conjuncture affecting the Chilean 
economy, where interest rates on savings are 
inflated. 
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modern units. Indeed, not only can they units can be diminished by imperfections 
survive but they can even, as in the in the product and factor markets. 
recent case of UNICOOP, push the latter Although the general behaviour anticipa-
out of the market. ted for informal units in concentrated 
Secondly, the analysis of income markets can be predicted for the long 
differentials and returns on factors of term, the rate is difficult to forecast and 
production also suggests that this infor- the trend might differ in the medium 
mal-sector activity represents an efficient term. In addition, changes in the market 
use of resources, given the overall will probably occur discontinuously 
framework of job scarcity in the modern rather than following a smooth path. 
sector, the low purchasing power which Until substantial changes have come 
characterizes the market, and the organi- about in the purchasing capacity of the 
zation of production in the informal majority of the population and the 
units. prevailing mode of production of these 
Finally, trends are difficult to units, it is highly likely that their ability 
anticipate because competition between to compete will ensure their survival. 
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